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Abstract
Emerging market crises are characterized by large swings in both macroeconomic funda-
mentals and asset prices. The economic signiﬁcance of observed movements in macroeconomic
variables is obscured by the brief and extreme nature of crises. In this paper we propose to study
the macroeconomic consequences of crises by studying the behavior of “eﬀective” fundamentals,
constructed by studying the relative movements of stock prices during crises. We ﬁnd that these
eﬀective fundamentals provide a diﬀerent picture than that implied by observed fundamentals.
First, asset prices often reﬂect expectations of improvement in fundamentals after the initial
devaluations; speciﬁcally, eﬀective depreciations are positive but not as large as the observed
ones. Second, crises vary in their eﬀect on credit market conditions, with investors expecting
tightening of credit in some cases (Mexico 1994, Philippines 1997), but loosening of credit in
others (Sweden 1992, Korea 1997, Brazil 1999).
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Balance of payment crises in emerging markets have been a prevalent phenomenon during the
last 10 years. In all cases, these crises were associated with large movements in both asset prices
and macroeconomic fundamentals in the aﬀected countries. For example, between December 1994
and March 1995, Mexico’s stock market fell 26 percent in peso terms, the Mexican peso depreciated
by 50 percent, and peso interest rates rose to 70 percent in annualized terms. These patterns were
repeated, to a varying extent, during the Asian crisis in 1997, the Russian crisis in 1998, and the
Brazilian crisis in 1999.
In this paper, we assess the economic signiﬁcance of these shocks by studying the cross-sectional
behavior of stock returns during crises. In particular, we estimate the set of macroeconomic inno-
vations that best explain the relative returns of stocks in each country. We denote these implied
macroeconomic variables as “eﬀective” fundamentals.
We propose this alternative measure of macroeconomic variables because directly observed
fundamentals are diﬃcult to interpret given the brief and extreme nature of crises. For example,
consider the behavior of interest rates and exchange rates during crises, illustrated in Figure I
for the cases of Mexico 1994 and Korea 1997.1 B a l a n c eo fp a y m e n t sc r i s e sa r ec h a r a c t e r i z e db y
a dramatic rise in interest rates to deter speculation and to reduce excessive depreciation and
inﬂationary pass-through. However, these interest rate shocks are less persistent than during non-
crisis times, as they are often reversed after a few months. In Mexico 1994 a large part of the shock
was reversed in three months, while in Korea 1997 interest rates nine months after the devaluation
were below those observed one year prior to it. An even more extreme example occurred in Sweden
1992 when the Central Bank’s lending rate reached 500 percent in mid-September, but reverted to
historical levels over the following two months. This suggests that observed interest rate shocks
1The ﬁgure depicts domestic-currency short-term interest rates. For Mexico we show the annualized return on
28-day government bonds, and for Korea the annualized money market rate.
1during crises might overestimate their actual impact on credit market conditions. On the other
hand, if there exist credit constraints that become binding during crises, observed interest rate
shocks might underestimate the eﬀect of crises. As a result, it is diﬃcult to assess the eﬀect of
crises on credit market conditions by looking at the evolution of interest rates. Instead, in this
paper we look at the behavior of eﬀective interest rates to factor in the persistence of the shock
and possible nonlinearities in the impact of crises on credit markets.
Interpreting exchange rate movements during crises also presents diﬃculties, since the size of
depreciations during crises is much larger than those observed during non-crisis times. While
exchange rates have traditionally been modelled as random walks, it is not obvious how the market
regards the persistence of these unprecedented shocks. A casual look at the subsequent appreciation
of the Korean won in 1998 suggests that the won may have exhibited “overshooting,” while the
same cannot be said of the Mexican peso. However, such statements cannot be made with any
conﬁdence as the behavior of exchange rates after the crises could be due to subsequent shocks
unknown to investors at the time of the devaluation. By looking at the eﬀective exchange rate
during the crisis, we are able to determine whether investors anticipated a future reversal of the
initial devaluation.
In this paper, we estimate the impact of macroeconomic fundamentals through the lens of asset
prices. In particular, we focus on the information provided by the cross-sectional behavior of equity
returns within a given country.2 This is motivated in part by the observation that the cross-sectional
variance of stock returns is large during crises, which suggests that investors discriminate between
diﬀerent ﬁrms during these episodes. Figure II illustrates this point for the case of Mexico during
2Previous studies have usually used information from cross-sections of countries. For example, Frankel and Rose
[1995], Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco [1996], Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart [1998], and Kaminsky and Reinhart
[1999] study the factors that make countries vulnerable to crises, while Milesi-Ferretti and Razin [1998], Kaminsky
and Reinhart [1999], Barro [2001], and Hutchison and Neuberger [2002] study the eﬀects of crises. While such studies
provide valuable information regarding the general characteristics of crises, they are constrained by the fact that
crises might have diﬀerent characteristics in diﬀerent countries and at diﬀerent times. Two recent papers on the
Mexican crisis that also use disaggregated stock return data are Becker, Gelos, and Richards [2002], which estimates
devaluation expectations prior to the crisis and Wilson, Saunders, and Caprio [2000] which studies the transmission
channel from devaluation to credit markets.
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Panel A plots the annualized nominal 28-day Mexican T-Bill peso interest rate (solid
line, left axis) and the peso per dollar exchange rate (dotted line, right axis). Panel
B plots the annualized Korean money market won interest rate (solid line, left axis)
and the won per dollar exchange rate (dotted line, right axis). Source: IFS
the peso devaluation in December 1994 and Russia’s default in August 1998.
We pursue a two stage methodology. First, we measure the sensitivity of individual stock returns
to innovations in macroeconomic variables during non-crisis months using a standard multi-factor
model. This provides us with a collection of factor loadings or “betas” that describe how each
stock responds to non-crisis macroeconomic innovations. Second, we use the betas as independent
variables in a cross-sectional regression of crisis returns. We interpret the coeﬃcients estimated in
the second-stage regression as eﬀective or normal-period equivalent macroeconomic fundamentals.
3FIGURE II






















































































































Diﬀerence between 90th and 10th percentile in individual stock (monthly) returns
in Mexico.
In particular, they are the fundamentals that, had they occurred during a tranquil period, would
best explain the cross section of observed crisis returns.3
We study the crises in Mexico 1994, Korea 1997, Thailand 1997, Malaysia 1997, the Philippines
1997, Indonesia 1997, and Brazil 1999. We also include Sweden 1992 as a reference case. We chose
as the macroeconomic fundamentals the short-term interest rate to assess credit market conditions
and the exchange rate to explore issues of overshooting.4
The results indicate that all crises were associated with eﬀective depreciations. However, the
depreciations were in general signiﬁcantly smaller than the observed ones. We test whether the
smaller eﬀective depreciations at the time of the crises could be due to markets’ anticipation of the
crises. We ﬁnd that during the preceding months, only in Thailand did markets reﬂect anticipation.
3We will discuss in detail how the results can be interpreted in a model in which crises can induce changes in
factor sensitivities or risk premia.
4In a previous draft we included inﬂation and industrial production as additional factors. Due to the limited
variation in these variables, their corresponding betas and, consequently, their eﬀective innovations were estimated
very imprecisely. The addition of these factors, or replacing nominal interest rates with a measure of real interest
rates, did not aﬀect any of the results.
4Moreover, stock prices during and after the crises in Korea, the Philippines, and Brazil suggest that
the market anticipated a partial reversal of the initial depreciations (overshooting). The rebound
of the exchange rates in Korea and Brazil in the quarter after the devaluations, while seemingly a
surprise to many analysts at the time, was apparently priced into stocks early on in the crisis.5
The behavior of eﬀective interest rates suggests that crises diﬀer in their eﬀect on credit market
conditions. This heterogeneity is not apparent in directly observed interest rates, as these usually
indicate worsening conditions. Perhaps the most surprising result is that in the cases of Sweden
1992, Korea 1997, and Brazil 1999 the eﬀective increase in interest rates is negative. Namely, the
relative movement in stock returns indicates that investors associated these crises with an easing
of monetary policy and no serious eﬀects on the countries’ ﬁnancial markets.6
On the other hand, in the case of Mexico the eﬀective increase in interest rates is positive and
very large. In fact, it is actually larger than the observed one of 22 percent, even though interest
rate shocks during crises are short-lived. In the Philippines, the eﬀective increase in interest rates is
also positive and not statistically diﬀerent from the observed one. This is consistent with investors
expecting credit crunches in both Mexico and the Philippines. Malaysia is a special case in terms
of observed fundamentals in that the money market rate actually fell during the crisis of 1997.
However, the eﬀective change in interest is zero, implying that credit conditions did not ease
despite the observed drop in interest rates.
The results thus show that directly observed fundamentals can provide a misleading picture of
the eﬀects of crises. First, while observed interest rates suggest a deterioration in credit market
conditions in almost all cases, eﬀective interest rates show that some countries actually experi-
ence improvement. In addition, markets consistently discount the observed large depreciations
5Note that the smaller movement in the eﬀective exchange rate during crises is not a forecast underpredicting
an extreme realization. The eﬀective exchange rate is a summary of information implied by the contemporaneous
movements in asset prices, not a standard forecast.
6Our results may reﬂect that ﬁrms mitigated whatever credit crunch there was by tapping into alternative avenues
of ﬁnance, such as merging with foreign ﬁrms. See for example Aguiar and Gopinath (forthcoming). For alternative
evidence on Korea, see Borensztein and Lee (2002).
5suggesting exchange rate overshooting.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II outlines the theoretical framework for relating
stock returns to macroeconomic fundamentals; section III describes the empirical methodology;
section IV contains the empirical results; and section V concludes.
II. Theoretical Framework
As noted in the introduction, interpreting directly-observed macroeconomic variables during
crises as if they occurred during tranquil periods is likely to provide an incomplete, and possibly
misleading, description of the economic impact of these fundamentals. As a result, we propose
to calculate a set of eﬀective innovations to fundamentals by estimating the market’s assessment
of those fundamentals implicit in the cross-sectional behavior of stock prices. The essence of our
approach is outlined in the diagram below. During normal periods, we estimate a mapping β
from macroeconomic shocks F into stock returns Z, determined by the sensitivity of each stock to
each macroeconomic fundamental. During crisis periods, we take the inverse of this mapping and
estimate the eﬀective or “implied” fundamentals F∗ based on observed returns.
Normal Periods: F - Z
β
Crisis Periods: F∗ ¾ Z
β−1
In the rest of the section, we describe the normal period mapping and discuss how to interpret the
reverse mapping during crises.
II.1. A Multi-Factor Model of Asset Returns
Deﬁne the one-period log return on a stock as
6Zt+1 =l o g ( Pt+1 + Dt+1) − log(Pt), (1)
where P and D represent price and dividend, respectively. Following Campbell and Shiller [1988],
aT a y l o re x p a n s i o ny i e l d s
Zt+1 ≈ k + ρpt+1 +( 1− ρ)dt+1 − pt, (2)
where lower-case letters represent logs, and ρ and k are constants.7 By imposing the terminal
condition limi→∞ Etρipt+i = 0, Campbell and Shiller solve the diﬀerence equation (2) to yield an












Following Campbell [1991], we can use this expression to write the realized return as the sum of
the expected return and innovations to log dividends and future expected returns,
Zt+1 = EtZt+1 +( Et+1 − Et)
∞ X
s=0




where ∆dt+1is the dividend growth rate between period t and t+1and(Et+1−Et)x represents the
revision in the expectation of x due to information obtained between periods t and t +1 . In this
framework, unexpected returns are attributed to a combination of revisions to expected dividend
growth and changes in future expected returns.
Expression (4) is an approximation of an identity, not a particular model of returns. Our ﬁrst
restrictive assumption is to assume that the revision to expected future dividend growth for a
7The expansion is done around the long-run dividend-price ratio, and ρ =
1
1+(D/P) ∈ (0,1).
7given stock is a linear function of macroeconomic and idiosyncratic innovations realized at time t.





1,t+1 + ···+ βj,kF∗
K,t+1 + uj,t+1, (5)
where F∗
k,t+1 : k =1 ,...,K represent eﬀective innovations to macroeconomic variables, βj,k : k =
1,...,K represent sensitivities to innovations in fundamentals, and uj,t+1 represents the idiosyn-
cratic component of shocks to dividends. The important assumption behind equation (5) is the
existence of a stable, linear relationship between innovations to eﬀective macroeconomic fundamen-
tals and expected dividend growth. We further assume that during non-crisis periods, observed
and eﬀective innovations to fundamentals are equal.8
In addition, we assume that expected returns (i.e. risk premia) are constant during tranquil
periods, and that the timing of a crisis is not known in advance. This latter assumption ensures
that crises are “news” and will therefore be reﬂected by changes in asset prices. In particular, we
have (Et+1 − Et)
P∞
s=1 ρsZj,t+1+s =0 ,a n dEtZj,t+1 ≡ βj,0.
We can therefore represent tranquil-period returns on stock j at time t as a linear function of
innovations to macroeconomic variables plus an idiosyncratic noise term,
Zj,t = βj,0 +
K X
k=1
βj,kFk,t + uj,t, (6)
where Fk,t+1 : k =1 ,...,K,r e p r e s e n tobserved innovations to macroeconomic variables. Equation
(6) is a multi-factor model of asset returns. Many asset pricing theories impose restrictions on this
expression; however, we do not impose any in our empirical implementation, since our main interest
is in using asset prices as a source of information about the fundamentals F rather than testing a
speciﬁc model of asset pricing.
8We explain below why a distinction is made between observed and eﬀective fundamentals.
8II.2. Crisis Fundamentals
In this subsection we use the linear model just presented to illustrate the diﬀerence between
observed and eﬀective innovations to fundamentals. For simplicity, suppose that there is only one
fundamental, for example, short-term interest rates. Also, suppose that at time tc an unexpected
crisis starts and interest rates rise sharply (i.e. Fr,tc,w h e r er stands for interest rates, is positive
and large). If investors responded to movements in observed interest rates during crises as if they
occurred during a non-crisis period, we would expect stock returns to equal
Zj,tc = βj,0 + βj,rFr,tc + uj,tc. (7)
However, there are three reasons why the relationship between observed interest rate movements
and stock returns may be diﬀerent during crisis and non-crisis times. First, the time series properties
of interest rates may change during crises. For example, the interest rate might become more mean
reverting during crises if high interest rates are expected to last for a short period of time. Second,
there maybe a non-linear relationship between stock returns and interest rates that is reﬂected in a
change in the sensitivity of stock returns to movements in interest rates during crises. For example,
if credit constraints that do not bind in normal times become binding during crises. Third, there
may be changes to the risk premia associated with interest rates. Although these possibilities are
not mutually exclusive, we argue next that they can all be interpreted as stock returns responding
to an eﬀective innovation to interest rates that may be diﬀerent from the observed innovation.
Suppose that during crises, stock returns are characterized by
Zj,tc = βj,0 + δ0 + βj,rF∗
r,tc + uj,tc, (8)
where F∗
r,tc is the eﬀective innovation to the interest rate, and δ0 is a constant that captures the
possibility of an aggregate shock. How would F∗
r,tc reﬂect the three channels mentioned above?
9First, if the interest rate becomes more mean reverting during crises, then the eﬀective innovation
would be smaller and F∗
r,tc = ΦFr,tc,w h e r eΦ < 1. Second, if stocks become more sensitive to
interest rate movements during crises, then F∗
r,tc = ΦFr,tc where Φ > 1.9
Third, to show that changes in risk premia may also be captured by our eﬀective fundamentals
we assume that risk is priced according to the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT). Namely, we assume
that expected returns satisfy




where λk is the risk premium associated with factor k and λ0 is the return on the “zero-beta”
portfolio.
F o re x a m p l e ,s u p p o s et h a ta tt i m etc an unexpected crisis starts which lasts for one period.









and the stock return at time tc is then given by
Zj,tc = Etc−1Zj,tc +( Etc − Etc−1)
∞ X
s=0














= βj,0 − ρ∆λ0 +
X
k
βj,k (Φk,tcFk,tc − ρ∆λk)+uj,tc. (11)
9One can think of βj,r as reﬂecting a stable, linear relationship between stock returns and changes in some
intermediate unobserved variable, say credit conditions; and a time varying Φ (normalized to 1 in non-crisis times)
as reﬂecting a non-linear relationship between this variable and interest rates. We thank our referee for suggesting
this interpretation.
10Equation (11) can be reconciled with equation (8) by identifying the constant δ0 with the change
in the country risk premium ρ∆λ0, and by deﬁning eﬀective fundamentals as
F∗
k,tc = Φk,tcFk,tc − ρ∆λk. (12)
In our empirical analysis, we estimate F∗
k,tc by regressing crisis returns on non-crisis factor
sensitives. Although given the brief nature of crises we cannot separately identify the three reasons
why eﬀective and observed fundamentals diﬀer, this is not crucial for the overall interpretation of
the results. However, one should keep in mind that when referring to eﬀective fundamentals we are
using this broad deﬁnition.
III. Empirical Methodology
The last section motivated a simple model of stock returns,
Zj,t = βj,0 +
K X
k=1
βj,kFk,t + uj,t,i ft ∈ TN (13)




k,t + uj,t,i ft ∈ TC,
where TN,T C represent normal periods and crisis periods, respectively. For a given country, there
are K macroeconomic fundamentals and J stocks spanning months T = TN ∪ TC.10
III.1. Estimation of eﬀective fundamentals
We assume that the idiosyncratic shocks uj,t are normally distributed and independent across
time and stocks. We allow the within period variance to vary across stocks and between normal
10In practice, TN will vary across stocks.
11and crisis periods. Speciﬁcally, let uN,u C represent the JTN ×1a n dJTC ×1 vectors of residuals,
respectively. That is uN =( u1,···,u J)0 where uj =( uj,1,···uj,TN)0 and similarly for uC. Then,
E(uNu0
N)=σ2
N (Ω ⊗ ITN) (14)
E(uCu0
C)=σ2
C (Ω ⊗ ITC),
where Ω is the J × J matrix
Ω =







    

(15)
and IT is a T ×T identity matrix. Note that we allow the scale factors σ2
N and σ2
C to diﬀer between
crisis and normal periods. The relative heteroscedasticity between stocks is captured by the matrix
Ω.11
The log likelihood function is therefore




















11We do not have enough data to estimate cross-correlations among stocks. As we will see below, this does not
matter for the estimation of β. For the crisis, we account for an aggregate component to the residuals by including
ac o n s t a n t .
12m = N,C
Our estimation strategy begins by deﬁning the normal and crisis periods. Suppose that the
crisis begins at time τ.12 The normal period is then t ∈ [1,τ − 4] ∪ [τ +6 ,T]. The crisis period
is divided into three 3-month sub-periods: Pre-crisis = t ∈ [τ − 3,τ − 1], Crisis = t ∈ [τ,τ +2 ] ,
and Post-crisis = t ∈ [τ +3 ,τ + 5]. The reason for including the immediate pre- and post-crisis
months separately is to allow for tests of anticipation and overshooting, to be described below.
Also, reporting results from the borders of the event window makes explicit how the results would


















To ensure that the estimate of the vector β reﬂects the normal relationship between funda-
mentals and returns, we do not include the crisis periods in their estimation. That is, we do not
minimize lnL over the entire period, but instead chose estimates of β, denoted b, that minimize
the log-likelihood restricted to normal periods lnLN. This is asymptotically equivalent to using
the entire sample given that we are simply dropping 9 observations, although we are sacriﬁcing
ﬁnite-sample eﬃciency. Given the i.i.d. assumption regarding the behavior of returns, the ML
estimate of β is simply equation by equation least squares.13
The second step is to estimate the eﬀective fundamentals, F∗,w h i c hi st h e3 ( K+1)×1 vector of
coeﬃcients, corresponding to K fundamentals and one constant for the pre-crisis, crisis, and post-
12Usually, we take the start of the crisis as the month of the devaluation or the beginning of massive capital
outﬂows.
13Our assumption that stocks are independent within periods is not important in the ﬁrst stage of the estimation.
GLS in this set up is Zellner’s Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR). A feature of SUR is that it collapses to equation
by equation least squares when all equations have identical regressors, which is the case here. Note also that since
we are excluding crisis periods in the estimation of b, there is no need to iterate between the estimates of b and F
∗.
13crisis periods.14 We use the normal period residuals to form a consistent estimate of the covariance
matrix Ω as well as σ2
N.T oﬁnd the maximum likelihood estimates of F∗, we minimize lnLC with
respect to F∗,g i v e nt h ee s t i m a t e sb and ˆ Ω. The solution to this is equivalent to a (GLS) regression
of returns Z −b0 on the estimates b and a constant, where b0 is the J ×1 vector of constants from
the ﬁrst stage regression. We sum the returns over the months of each of the three sub-periods,
leaving one observation per stock in each of the three second-stage regressions. The residuals from
the second stage provide an estimate of σ2
C, the common scaling factor for the residual covariance
matrix during crises.15
Given that we are using the estimated b instead of the true β, we need to adjust the standard
error of the second stage regression.16 We do this as outlined by Murphy and Topel [1985]. Specif-
ically, let V0 be the uncorrected covariance matrix from the GLS estimates of F∗,a n dVb be the
covariance matrix for the ﬁrst stage estimates of β. Then the corrected covariance matrix VF∗ is
VF∗ = V0 + V0CVbC0V0, (18)
where
C = σ2
C (B ⊗ I3)
0 Ω(IJ ⊗ F∗) (19)
and IM is a M × M identity matrix, B is a J × K matrix of the estimated factor sensitivities and
F∗ is the K × 3 matrix containing the estimated eﬀective fundamentals.
III.2. Interpretation of eﬀective fundamentals
14An equivalent procedure would be to estimate the deviations from the observed fundamental, δ ≡ F
∗−F and then
calculate the implied fundamental by adding δ to the observed value. Instead, we estimate the eﬀective fundamental
directly, and then subtract this from the observed value to calculate δ. There is no diﬀerence between the two
estimation strategies.
15We estimate a single σ
2










j,τ,w h e r eˆ ej,τ is the j
th stock’s residual in the τ ∈ {pre, crisis, post} sub-period.
16Our estimate of F
∗ is consistent, given that the ﬁrst stage estimation error goes to zero as T approaches inﬁnity.
14At a very mechanical level, the eﬀective fundamentals are the macroeconomic shocks that “best”
explain the observed cross-section of returns during a crisis, given the vector of factor sensitivities.
As i g n i ﬁcant F∗ indicates that the factor sensitivity has power in explaining the cross-section of
returns; for example, a positive eﬀective interest rate implies that interest rate sensitive stocks
decline more than average. The value of the estimated fundamental is interpreted as the crisis
fundamental’s normal-period equivalent – that is, the fundamental that best explains observed
crisis returns using the normal period mapping from macro variables to stock returns.
In addition, we use the estimates of F∗ to determine whether the observed fundamentals ac-
curately reﬂect market perceptions. Let us deﬁne δk as the diﬀerence between the kth eﬀective
fundamental and its observed counterpart,
δk ≡ F∗
k − Fk.
As an example, suppose the fundamental consists of changes in the log exchange rate (where a
positive movement is an appreciation). Using the methodology proposed above, we can estimate the
eﬀective depreciation that best explains the cross section of stock returns. If the market considered
that conditions were worse than observed, δ would be negative, while if the market discounted the
impact of the drop in the exchange rate, δ would be positive.
One reason why δ may be diﬀerent from zero is that the news regarding the fundamental
was already incorporated into stock prices. For example, suppose that in the month prior to the
devaluation the market correctly anticipated the change in currency regime. When the devaluation
occurs, stocks do not respond and the implied δ is positive and equal to minus the observed
fundamental, i.e. F∗ = F + δ =0 . To explore this possibility, we estimate the pre-crisis eﬀective
fundamentals; if the market had anticipated the devaluation, it would be reﬂected in a negative
pre-crisis δ. Similarly, we estimate the post-crisis eﬀective fundamentals to analyze the possibility
of expected reversals or “overshooting.” If the market expected the devaluation to be partially
15reversed, the crisis period δ would be positive, while the post-crisis δ would be negative. The
following diagram summarizes,
Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis Interpretation
δpre < 0 δcrisis > 0= ⇒ Anticipation
δcrisis > 0 δpost < 0= ⇒ Overshooting
In interpreting the eﬀective fundamentals it is important to note a few caveats. First, the analy-
sis is sensitive to the assumption that the crisis overshadows anything else taking place during the
pre-crisis and post-crisis windows. For example, a negative pre-crisis δ is interpreted as anticipa-
tion of the crisis and not driven by reaction to events preceding the pre-crisis months. This is a
plausible assumption given that crises tend to stand out in terms of stock returns and movements
of fundamentals.
Second, as mentioned in section II.2, we cannot determine whether an eﬀective fundamental
diﬀers from the observed fundamental during crises due to a change in the stochastic properties of
the fundamental, a change in the sensitivity of stock returns to the fundamental, or a change in the
risk premium associated with the fundamental. However, this does not pose a serious problem for
the overall interpretation of our results. For example, whether a shock to interest rates is eﬀectively
more serious than the observed shock due to market participants expecting interest rates to remain
high for a long time, due to stocks becoming more sensitive to interest rate shocks due to non-
linear credit frictions, or due to an increase in the risk premium associated with interest rates due
to higher uncertainty in credit markets, it is still the case that credit market conditions deteriorated
more than captured in observed interest rates changes. In other words, although we cannot identify
empirically the three reasons why eﬀective and observed fundamentals might diﬀer during crises,
we believe this is not a serious problem since they are quite close conceptually.
16Third, we assume that the mapping β between fundamentals and returns is stable, both between
crisis and non-crisis times and between diﬀerent non-crisis periods. Given the brevity of crises, we
cannot test for stability of the β’s during crises. For our results to be valid qualitatively, the
important assumption is that the relative sensitivities of stocks remain stable during crises. For
example, stocks that are usually more sensitive to movements in interest rates during tranquil
times should remain so during crises. This does not seem to be a strong assumption. However, the
quantitative results rely explicitly on a stable mapping, and thus must be interpreted “conditional”
on a given vector of β’s; that is, “as if” the macroeconomic shocks occurred during non-crisis
periods. To account for the possibility that the β’s are not stable during non-crisis times, we
estimated the non-crisis β’s using diﬀerent normal-period subsamples. Our results were stable
across alternative ﬁrst stage subsamples. In Appendix table one we report the results using as our
non-crisis sample the immediate twenty-four months after the crisis event window.
IV. Empirical Results
In this section, we apply the methodology described above to study a number of emerging market
crises that took place during the 1990’s. We present results on crises in Mexico in 1994, Korea,
Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines in 1997, and Brazil in 1999. For comparison,
we also include Sweden’s crisis of 1992.17 Table I illustrates the impact of these episodes, and
summarizes their eﬀects on macroeconomic variables. The table makes clear that the crises were
periods of large drops in stock markets and large swings in macroeconomic variables.
IV.1. Data and First Stage Regressions
17Speciﬁcally, the Mexican crisis begins in December 1994, Korea in October 1997, Southeast Asia in July 1997,
Brazil in December 1998 and Sweden in October 1992. While the timing usually coincides with the devaluation, the
results are robust to alternative starting points given that we study a 9 month window. We did not include Argentina
1994 and Russia 1998 due to the small number of stocks for which we have data.
17TABLE I
Summary Statistics
Cumulative totals: ∆e ∆r Market
Mexico 1994 -0.55 0.21 -0.42
Korea 1997 -0.65 0.09 -0.53
Thailand 1997 -0.34 0.13 -0.17
Malaysia 1997 -0.16 -0.01 -0.37
Philippines 1997 -0.18 0.05 -0.44
Indonesia 1997 -0.30 0.32 -0.11
Brazil 1999 -0.56 0.15 0.16
Sweden 1992 -0.04 0.00 0.02
Source: IFS, DataStream. Market is DataStream total market return index.
∆r is change in log monthly interest rate(change in log(1 + r), where r is
annualized rate). Interest rate is IFS T-Bill for Mexico and the Philippines,
otherwise IFS money market. ∆e is log change in either nominal exchange rate
(expressed as dollars/local currency) or nominal eﬀective exchange rate index
(Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia, and Sweden) provided by IFS (increase is
an appreciation). All values are cumulative sums over pre-crisis and crisis sub-
periods: Mexico 9/94-2/95, South East Asia: 4/97-9/97, Korea: 7/97-12/97,
Brazil: 9/98-2/99, Sweden: 8/92-11/92.
For stock returns, we use monthly log changes in the return index from DataStream. The data
range from December 1990 through April 2000, although not all stocks span this entire period. The
number of stocks per country ranges from 62 in Mexico to 330 in Malaysia. (See Table III.)
We concentrate on two macroeconomic fundamentals, short-term interest rates and exchange
rates. In a previous version of the paper, we also included industrial production and inﬂation,
but these factors were rarely signiﬁcant if we included the two primary factors.18 Neither did we
include many common factors from the ﬁnance literature, such as the market return or company
characteristics (size, book-to-market, etc.). These are usually of interest to prove or disprove a
particular model of asset pricing, which is not our focus.
For the exchange rate, we use the nominal eﬀective exchange rate index as calculated by the
IMF’s International Financial Statistics. An increase in this index is an appreciation of the local
currency. If this series was unavailable, we used the dollar exchange rate expressed as dollars/local
currency to preserve the sign convention of the IFS index. For interest rates we use money market
18As mentioned in the introduction, the eﬀective innovations for industrial production and inﬂation were estimated
very imprecisely. The addition of these factors, or replacing nominal interest rates with a measure of real interest
rates, did not aﬀect the conclusions regarding the two primary fundamentals.
18rates reported by the IFS when available (Thailand, Indonesia, Korea, Brazil and Sweden) and
otherwise T-Bill rates (Mexico, Malaysia, and the Philippines). The short maturities of these debt
instruments justify the use of nominal interest rates rather than trying to construct real interest
rates.19
Table II summarizes the macro fundamentals for normal and crisis periods. For exchange rate
innovations, we use the monthly change in the log exchange rate. Given a large literature that fails
to out-predict this model at monthly frequencies, this seems a reasonable assumption. Similarly,
for the interest rate we take monthly changes in the log of the gross (annualized) interest rate, i.e.
Fr = ln(1 + rt+1) − ln(1 + rt). The random walk assumption behind the choice of innovations for
interest rates is less grounded in the empirical literature, but the absence of a long time series to
accurately estimate an alternative process for the interest rate makes monthly changes the best
available choice. To verify the robustness of the results to the random walk assumption, we also
estimated an AR(1) for both the exchange rate and the interest rate and used the residuals as
innovations. We report the results using this alternative model in Appendix table two.20
In the ﬁrst stage, we estimate the vector b of factor sensitivities for each stock as in equation (13).
Table III reports summary statistics by country for the ﬁrst-stage regressions.
IV.2. Estimates of Eﬀective Fundamentals
The eﬀective fundamentals are estimated, as described in Section III, by regressing the crisis
returns on the factor sensitivities. Speciﬁcally, we calculate excess returns for each stock, Zt,j−bj,0,
and sum these returns over each sub-period. We then regress the sub-period excess returns on the
estimated interest rate and exchange rate sensitivities, including a constant and using the ˆ Ω as a
19We also found that cross-sectional variation in sensitivities to ex post real interest rates are driven by sensitivities
to nominal interest rates and not inﬂation. The results from the second stage regressions are therefore not sensitive
to the choice between nominal and ex post real interest rates.
20Appendix table two indicates the main results are robust to this alternative model of fundamental innovations.
The one exception is Brazil, particularly the results regarding the implied exchange rate. This may be due to the
instability in Brazil’s exchange rate regime during the 1990s.
19weighting matrix. This produces estimates of the two (cumulative) eﬀective fundamentals for each
sub-period.21 The deviations δ are constructed by subtracting observed fundamentals from these
estimates.
Tables IV through XI contain the results of the second stage regressions. Panel A of each table
contains the estimates of the cumulative implied fundamentals F∗ for the three crisis sub-periods.
For comparison, panel A also includes the observed fundamentals. Panel B compares the estimated
eﬀective fundamentals to the observed fundamentals. We postpone discussion of panel C until the
next subsection.
In order to focus the discussion, we begin with a description of Sweden 1992, which is the
reference case (Table XI). For Sweden, we limit the sub-periods to two months to ensure that the
one-month interest rate spike remains observable, with the entire period ranging from August 1992
through January 1993. From the observed fundamentals reported in panel A, we see that during
the two months of the pre-crisis period, money market interest rates increased by 48 percent in
log terms. Over the months of October and November, the central bank completely reversed the
interest rate hike and devalued the currency by roughly 5 percent. In the two months immediately
after this period, the currency fell another 13 percent. Panels A and B of Table XI report that
the entire interest rate hike was discounted by the market. Panel A reports that the eﬀective
increase in the interest rate was basically zero. On the way back down, the eﬀective fundamental is
signiﬁcantly below zero at the 10 percent level, but much smaller in magnitude than the observed
fundamental. The point estimate for the pre-crisis implied exchange rate indicates an anticipated
devaluation of roughly 3.4 percent (although with a relatively large standard error). The crisis and
post-crisis columns indicate that investors discounted the observed devaluation once it occurred.
In short, the Swedish results are consistent with the story that on the eve of the devaluation the
market ignored the large increase in interest rates and partially priced in a devaluation, and were
21We cumulate over three-month windows around the crises to avoid biasing the results due to temporary trading
illiquidity during crises.
20not surprised when they were vindicated by actual events.
At ﬁrst glance, the ease with which Europe dealt with the 1992 currency crisis diﬀers markedly
from the drama witnessed in Asia and Latin America. We now ask whether investors’ assessment
of fundamentals in emerging markets follows the relatively orderly process found in Sweden.
Tables IV through X contain the results for Mexico, Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Indonesia, and Brazil, respectively. First, note the diﬀerence between the implied and observed
exchange rate movements during the crisis sub-periods reported in panels B. In general, eﬀective
devaluations are not as large as observed devaluations. That is, the estimated δ for the exchange
rate is signiﬁcantly positive, exceeding 50 percentage points in some cases. This is true across all
crises except Indonesia. However, the implied fundamental is still signiﬁcantly negative, indicating
that stocks responded to the devaluation, only less severely than it would appear from the observed
drop in the exchange rate.
As noted in the previous section, this could be due to anticipation; namely, the devaluation may
already be priced into stocks. Looking at the pre-crisis sub-period, we see that there is evidence of
this in Thailand. In particular, Thai stocks reveal that a 12 percent devaluation was anticipated,
while the crisis saw the baht fall 35 percent. This may not be surprising; while we start the crisis
in July 1997 for Thailand, the weakness of the banking system was evident by June. However,
although the anticipated devaluation was much smaller than the one realized during the crisis, the
crisis δ of positive 30 percent indicates that the market largely discounted the entire devaluation
when it occurred. Brazil and Malaysia also have signiﬁcantly negative implied exchange rates in
the pre-crisis period. However, these currencies were classiﬁed as managed ﬂoats in the pre-crisis
period and the implied depreciations do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from those observed. We therefore
do not interpret the negative implied fundamental in the pre-crisis period as evidence that the
market anticipated the imminent collapse of the currencies.
Aside from anticipation, the failure of the market to fully react to the devaluation may be
21due to anticipated “overshooting.” That is, the large drop in the value of the currency is not
expected to persist (as the normal-period random walk process would imply), but instead bounce
back as the classic overshooting model would predict. In this case, we would see a positive δ for
the exchange rate in the crisis sub-period, but a negative value in the post-crisis sub-period. We
should note that a positive post-crisis δ does not imply that the exchange rate actually appreciates,
but that, whatever the realized movement, the market reacts as if the exchange rate moved by δ
less than observed. There is evidence consistent with overshooting in Korea, the Philippines, and
Brazil. For example, in Korea the eﬀective depreciation during the crisis sub-period is signiﬁcant
but, at 6 percent, is much smaller than the observed fall of 62 percent. During the post-crisis
sub-period, the Korean won did in fact appreciate by 21 percent. However, we estimate an eﬀective
depreciation of 8 percent in the post-crisis sub-period, suggesting that investors expected an even
larger appreciation. This is noteworthy given that the rally of early 1998 appeared to have been
a surprise to many observers. For example, shortly before this “disappointing” appreciation, the
January 6, 1998, issue of the Wall Street Journal carried a headline, “Asian Currencies Tumble
Against Dollar – Downward Spiral Appears Unlikely to End Soon.”
The results on exchange rates show regularity across crises. Eﬀective devaluations are signif-
icant, but substantially smaller than observed movements. Moreover, the market seems to have
expected a partial reversal of the initial devaluations in many of the crises, suggesting overshooting.
The results on interest rates, on the other hand, show important diﬀerences across crises. In the
case of Sweden, as discussed before, the spike in interest rates as the currency came under attack
was completely discounted by the market. In the introduction, we noted a similar rapid increase
in Mexican interest rates. In the case of Mexico, however, the eﬀective increase in the interest rate
was more than 26 percentage points, even larger than the observed increase of 22 percent.22 This
implies that investors treated the peso crisis as a signiﬁcant tightening in credit market conditions.
22The diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant at traditional conﬁdence levels. However, when we isolate December
1994 in Mexico on its own (not reported), the implied δ is signiﬁcant.
22Consistent with this, Aguiar (forthcoming) documents that the combination of dollar-denominated
debt and devaluation in Mexico exerted a negative impact on a ﬁrms ability to invest. In the case
of Malaysia, the eﬀective change in interest rates was zero, even though observed interest rates
decreased during the crisis sub-period. The (statistically signiﬁcant) diﬀerence between eﬀective
and observed interest rates suggest the market did not anticipate a loosening of credit as a result of
the devaluation. In fact, Malaysia did increase interest rates in the post-crisis sub-period, a move
which the market appears to have anticipated given the negative post-crisis δ. In the Philippines,
the eﬀective increase in interest rates was 4 percent, very close to the observed value, also suggesting
tightening of credit conditions.
The story is markedly diﬀerent regarding interest rates in the other countries in our sample.
During the crises in Thailand and Indonesia, the market apparently ignored the increase in the
interest rates observed during the crises. Interestingly, in Korea and Brazil the eﬀective change
in interest rates is in fact negative. This indicates that rather than credit markets tightening,
investors in these countries viewed the currency crises as heralding an easing of monetary policy.
While this is consistent with the classic view linking weak currencies with easy money, it stands in
contrast to the modern view that combines high interest rates and weak banks to produce a credit
crunch. This latter scenario ﬁnds more support in the results for Mexico and, to a lesser extent,
the Philippines. It may be the case that the spike in interest rates is accompanied by alternative
methods of ﬁnancing that mitigate the net eﬀect of the credit crunch. For example, Aguiar and
Gopinath (forthcoming) document a marked increase in foreign acquisitions of cash-poor ﬁrms
during and after the Asian crisis of 1997.
Looking at the pre-crisis sub-period, we see little evidence that markets anticipated the large
interest rate hikes. There is also little evidence of anticipation of reverting interest rates in the post-
crisis period. Speciﬁcally, the post-crisis δ’s on the interest rate sensitivities are not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero in Korea, Thailand or Brazil, implying that eﬀective fundamentals equal observed
23fundamentals in these sub-periods. The one exception in emerging markets is Indonesia, which
discounted the crisis jump in interest rates, perhaps expecting a fall in interest rates later (as
indicated by the positive post-crisis δ on interest rates). In the case of Mexico, the positive crisis
interest rate δ is weakly (in a statistical sense) matched by a negative post-crisis δ, which could be
interpreted as the initial overreaction was in anticipation of future interest rate hikes (which did in
fact occur).
V. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we study the relationship between asset prices and macroeconomic fundamentals
during currency crises. We show that investors discount the large depreciations that take place
during crises. There is evidence that this may be due to exchange-rate overshooting.
Moreover, interest-rate sensitivity is often an important determinant of stock performance dur-
ing crises, suggesting that credit market conditions play a signiﬁcant role during these episodes.
Interestingly, the sign of the implied interest rate innovation varied across countries. This may be
due to two opposite eﬀects on credit markets arising from devaluations. On the one hand, depreci-
ations are traditionally associated with a loosening of monetary policy, especially if the monetary
authorities had been trying to defend the peg by raising interest rates. On the other hand, devalu-
ations might entail a worsening in credit market condition through its eﬀect on collateral value and
balance sheets. It is noteworthy that the response of implied interest rates varied in sign across
apparently similar emerging market countries. In future work we hope to identify which factors
explain this variation and whether the diﬀerences in implied fundamentals foreshadow diﬀerences
in the speed of recovery.
In this paper we focused on crises as distinct form non-crisis periods, under the implicit the
assumption that crises are the most extreme and therefore the most important episodes to study.
The methodology could be used to estimate eﬀective fundamentals for any period for which we
24observe the cross section of stock returns. We have checked whether eﬀective fundamentals during
crises do indeed diﬀer from those implied by the cross-section of returns in other months. Not
surprisingly, we found that in most cases eﬀective exchange rate movements during crises are
extreme outliers. That is, while eﬀective fundamentals do not move as sharply as the observed
exchange rate during crises, they are nevertheless unusual events. Similarly, the movement in the
eﬀective interest rate in Mexico, Malaysia, and the Philippines were in the tail end of the sample.23
We also feel that the methodology used in this paper may be useful in other contexts in which
a short time series can be augmented with a rich cross section. One important application that
comes to mind are models of exchange rates with regime switches or time varying parameters.24
23A previous draft of the paper included both the methodology and results for these tests. It is available from the
authors.
24We are grateful to our referee for pointing us in this direction.
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27TABLE II
Macroeconomic Fundamentals
Country Fundamental Normal Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis
Mexico mean ∆e -0.005 -0.007 -0.175 -0.019
std. dev. ∆e 0.024 0.002 0.226 0.164
mean ∆r -0.004 -0.002 0.073 0.039
std. dev. ∆r 0.026 0.004 0.064 0.136
Korea mean ∆e -0.000 -0.010 -0.206 0.070
std. dev. ∆e 0.022 0.005 0.166 0.119
mean ∆r -0.002 0.006 0.024 0.003
std. dev. ∆r 0.011 0.004 0.035 0.026
Thailand mean ∆e 0.002 0.003 -0.116 -0.086
std. dev. ∆e 0.035 0.008 0.089 0.077
mean ∆r -0.001 0.020 0.025 -0.044
std. dev. ∆r 0.022 0.014 0.050 0.056
Malaysia mean ∆e 0.002 -0.009 -0.045 -0.055
std. dev. ∆e 0.023 0.009 0.040 0.036
mean ∆r -0.001 0.002 -0.005 0.008
std. dev. ∆r 0.004 0.027 0.043 0.002
Philippines mean ∆e 0.002 -0.003 -0.057 -0.028
std. dev. ∆e 0.024 0.011 0.033 0.037
mean ∆r -0.002 0.001 0.014 0.007
std. dev. ∆r 0.010 0.006 0.004 0.011
Indonesia mean ∆e -0.007 -0.004 -0.097 -0.116
std. dev. ∆e 0.110 0.000 0.052 0.124
mean ∆r -0.003 0.008 0.098 -0.027
std. dev. ∆r 0.036 0.014 0.226 0.051
Brazil mean ∆e -0.096 -0.006 -0.180 0.060
std. dev. ∆e 0.126 0.005 0.271 0.110
mean ∆r -0.023 0.051 0.001 -0.030
std. dev. ∆r 0.456 0.070 0.057 0.053
Sweden mean ∆e -0.001 0.002 -0.024 -0.066
std. dev. ∆e 0.013 0.000 0.032 0.051
mean ∆r -0.000 0.244 -0.242 -0.006
std. dev. ∆r 0.008 0.331 0.290 0.001
Summary of macroeconomic fundamentals used in ﬁrst stage regressions. ∆e refers to monthly
change in log exchange rate expressed as dollars/local currency for Mexico, Korea, Brazil, Indone-
sia, and Thailand. For Malaysia, the Philippines and Sweden, ∆e refers to monthly change in log
nominal eﬀective exchange rate as calculated by IFS. In both cases, a positive number indicates
an appreciation of the local currency. ∆r refers to log change in annualized gross interest rate.
The interest rate is the money market rate, except for Mexico and the Philippines, for which we
use the T-Bill rate. All data from IFS.
28TABLE III
Summary of First Stage Regressions
Country Regressors: ∆e ∆r median R2 median Obs Firms
Mexico median β 1.46 -0.14 0.11 91 62
std. dev. of β 0.92 0.66
median |t-stat| 2.58 0.92
Korea median β 1.91 -0.48 0.08 101 292
std. dev. of β 1.19 1.65
median |t-stat| 2.57 0.72
Thailand median β 0.21 0.16 0.02 99 225
std. dev. of β 0.96 1.27
median |t-stat| 0.83 0.72
Malaysia median β 1.68 -2.64 0.07 101 330
std. dev. of β 1.06 3.63
median |t-stat| 2.21 0.77
Philippines median β 0.63 -0.98 0.03 101 104
std. dev. of β 1.17 2.75
median |t-stat| 0.94 0.54
Indonesia median β 0.30 -0.24 0.06 102 135
std. dev. of β 0.39 0.73
median |t-stat| 2.00 0.80
Brazil median β -0.85 -0.08 0.11 69 73
std. dev. of β 1.59 0.77
median |t-stat| 2.47 0.74
Sweden median β 0.15 -1.97 0.02 128 114
std. dev. of β 0.79 3.49
median |t-stat| 0.58 1.34
Summary results of ﬁrst stage (time series) regression of stock return on macroeconomic factors.
Macroeconomic factors are monthly changes in log exchange rate and log (gross) annualized interest
rate, plus a constant. For each country, the ﬁrst row corresponds to the median estimated βk across
stocks within the country, the second to the cross-sectional standard deviation of estimated βk,
and the third to the median absolute value of t-stats across stocks. Units are such that a coeﬃcient
of 1 indicates that a 0.01 monthly change in the log exchange rate or (gross) annualized interest
rate is associated with a 0.01 monthly change in that stock’s log return index.
29TABLE IV
Results for Mexico 1994
Panel A: Eﬀective Fundamentals (F
∗)
Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis
Eﬀective Observed Eﬀective Observed Eﬀective Observed
Fundamental Fundamental Fundamental Fundamental Fundamental Fundamental
∆e (be) -0.020 -0.020 -0.242
∗∗∗ -0.526 -0.026 -0.057
( 0.037) ( 0.043) ( 0.037)
∆r (br) 0.009 -0.007 0.265
∗∗∗ 0.220 0.039 0.116




( 0.061) ( 0.071) ( 0.061)
Firms 62 62 62
R
2 0.01 0.37 0.01
G L Sr e g r e s s i o no ft h esum over each sub-period of excess returns (Z − b0) on factor sensitivities b plus a constant, producing
estimates of F∗
k (cumulative over each 3-month sub-period). Standard errors are calculated as described in section 3. Observed
fundamental is the sum of observed monthly changes in log exchange rates and log interest rates over the three months for
each sub-period. Pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis cover 9/94-11/94, 12/94-2/95, 3/95-5/95, respectively. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗refer to
signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel B: Eﬀective - Observed Fundamentals (δ)
Fundamental Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis
∆e 0.001 0.284
∗∗∗ 0.031
∆r 0.016 0.045 -0.077
This table presents the diﬀerence between the eﬀective fundamental (summed
over the three month sub-period) reported in panel A and the observed fun-
damental (also reported in panel A). Standard errors are not reported as they
are the same as those reported in panel A. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗refer to signiﬁcance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
30TABLE V
Results for Korea 1997
Panel A: Eﬀective Fundamentals (F
∗)
Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis
Eﬀective Observed Eﬀective Observed Eﬀective Observed
Fundamental Fundamental Fundamental Fundamental Fundamental Fundamental
∆e (be) -0.015 -0.030 -0.060
∗∗∗ -0.619 -0.081
∗∗∗ 0.209
( 0.019) ( 0.020) ( 0.020)
∆r (br) -0.007 0.019 -0.026
∗ 0.071 0.001 0.008





( 0.041) ( 0.042) ( 0.042)
Firms 292 292 292
R
2 0.01 0.03 0.07
G L Sr e g r e s s i o no ft h esum over each sub-period of excess returns (Z − b0) on factor sensitivities b plus a constant, producing
estimates of F∗
k (cumulative over each 3-month sub-period). Standard errors are calculated as described in section 3. Observed
fundamental is the sum of observed monthly changes in log exchange rates and log interest rates over the three months for
each sub-period. Pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis cover 7/97-9/97, 10/97-12/97, 1/98-3/98, respectively. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗refer to
signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel B: Eﬀective - Observed Fundamentals (δ)







This table presents the diﬀerence between the eﬀective fundamental (summed
over the three month sub-period) reported in panel A and the observed fun-
damental (also reported in panel A). Standard errors are not reported as they
are the same as those reported in panel A. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗refer to signiﬁcance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
31TABLE VI
Results for Thailand 1997
Panel A: Eﬀective Fundamentals (F
∗)
Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis
Eﬀective Observed Eﬀective Observed Eﬀective Observed
Fundamental Fundamental Fundamental Fundamental Fundamental Fundamental
∆e (be)- 0 . 1 2 3
∗∗∗ 0.008 -0.046 -0.347 -0.206
∗∗∗ -0.257
( 0.040) ( 0.040) ( 0.043)
∆r (br) -0.023 0.061 -0.038 0.074 -0.145
∗∗∗ -0.133




( 0.016) ( 0.016) ( 0.017)
Firms 225 225 225
R
2 0.13 0.01 0.23
G L Sr e g r e s s i o no ft h esum over each sub-period of excess returns (Z − b0) on factor sensitivities b plus a constant, producing
estimates of F∗
k (cumulative over each 3-month sub-period). Standard errors are calculated as described in section 3. Observed
fundamental is the sum of observed monthly changes in log exchange rates and log interest rates over the three months for
each sub-period. Pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis cover 4/97-6/97, 7/97-9/97, 10/97-12/97, respectively. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗refer to
signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel B: Eﬀective - Observed Fundamentals (δ)







This table presents the diﬀerence between the eﬀective fundamental (summed
over the three month sub-period) reported in panel A and the observed fun-
damental (also reported in panel A). Standard errors are not reported as they
are the same as those reported in panel A. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗refer to signiﬁcance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
32TABLE VII
Results for Malaysia 1997
Panel A: Eﬀective Fundamentals (F
∗)
Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis
Eﬀective Observed Eﬀective Observed Eﬀective Observed
Fundamental Fundamental Fundamental Fundamental Fundamental Fundamental




( 0.019) ( 0.019) ( 0.019)
∆r (br) -0.003 0.007 0.006 -0.014 -0.006 0.024





( 0.030) ( 0.031) ( 0.032)
Firms 330 330 330
R
2 0.09 0.21 0.10
G L Sr e g r e s s i o no ft h esum over each sub-period of excess returns (Z − b0) on factor sensitivities b plus a constant, producing
estimates of F∗
k (cumulative over each 3-month sub-period). Standard errors are calculated as described in section 3. Observed
fundamental is the sum of observed monthly changes in log exchange rates and log interest rates over the three months for
each sub-period. Pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis cover 4/97-6/97, 7/97-9/97, 10/97-12/97, respectively. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗refer to
signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel B: Eﬀective - Observed Fundamentals (δ)







This table presents the diﬀerence between the eﬀective fundamental (summed
over the three month sub-period) reported in panel A and the observed fun-
damental (also reported in panel A). Standard errors are not reported as they
are the same as those reported in panel A. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗refer to signiﬁcance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
33TABLE VIII
Results for Philippines 1997
Panel A: Eﬀective Fundamentals (F
∗)
Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis
Eﬀective Observed Eﬀective Observed Eﬀective Observed
Fundamental Fundamental Fundamental Fundamental Fundamental Fundamental
∆e (be) -0.024 -0.009 -0.046 -0.170 -0.127
∗∗∗ -0.084
( 0.028) ( 0.030) ( 0.029)
∆r (br) -0.013 0.004 0.041
∗∗ 0.043 0.009 0.021





( 0.032) ( 0.033) ( 0.033)
Firms 104 104 104
R
2 0.04 0.11 0.17
G L Sr e g r e s s i o no ft h esum over each sub-period of excess returns (Z − b0) on factor sensitivities b plus a constant, producing
estimates of F∗
k (cumulative over each 3-month sub-period). Standard errors are calculated as described in section 3. Observed
fundamental is the sum of observed monthly changes in log exchange rates and log interest rates over the three months for
each sub-period. Pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis cover 4/97-6/97, 7/97-9/97, 10/97-12/97, respectively. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗refer to
signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel B: Eﬀective - Observed Fundamentals (δ)
Fundamental Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis
∆e -0.014 0.124
∗∗∗ -0.043
∆r -0.017 -0.002 -0.012
This table presents the diﬀerence between the eﬀective fundamental (summed
over the three month sub-period) reported in panel A and the observed fun-
damental (also reported in panel A). Standard errors are not reported as they
are the same as those reported in panel A. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗refer to signiﬁcance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
34TABLE IX
Results for Indonesia 1997
Panel A: Eﬀective Fundamentals (F
∗)
Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis
Eﬀective Observed Eﬀective Observed Eﬀective Observed
Fundamental Fundamental Fundamental Fundamental Fundamental Fundamental
∆e (be) 0.066 -0.012 -0.467
∗∗∗ -0.292 -0.667
∗∗∗ -0.349
( 0.078) ( 0.080) ( 0.082)
∆r (br) -0.005 0.025 0.009 0.294 0.028 -0.081





( 0.033) ( 0.034) ( 0.034)
Firms 135 135 135
R
2 0.02 0.24 0.23
G L Sr e g r e s s i o no ft h esum over each sub-period of excess returns (Z − b0) on factor sensitivities b plus a constant, producing
estimates of F∗
k (cumulative over each 3-month sub-period). Standard errors are calculated as described in section 3. Observed
fundamental is the sum of observed monthly changes in log exchange rates and log interest rates over the three months for
each sub-period. Pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis cover 4/97-6/97, 7/97-9/97, 10/97-12/97, respectively. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗refer to
signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel B: Eﬀective - Observed Fundamentals (δ)







This table presents the diﬀerence between the eﬀective fundamental (summed
over the three month sub-period) reported in panel A and the observed fun-
damental (also reported in panel A). Standard errors are not reported as they
are the same as those reported in panel A. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗refer to signiﬁcance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
35TABLE X
Results for Brazil 1999
Panel A: Eﬀective Fundamentals (F
∗)
Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis
Eﬀective Observed Eﬀective Observed Eﬀective Observed
Fundamental Fundamental Fundamental Fundamental Fundamental Fundamental
∆e (be) -0.044
∗∗ -0.017 0.004 -0.540 -0.024 0.180
( 0.021) ( 0.024) ( 0.024)
∆r (br) -0.010 0.152 -0.119
∗∗ 0.002 -0.121
∗∗ -0.089




( 0.010) ( 0.012) ( 0.012)
Firms 73 73 73
R
2 0.03 0.03 0.06
G L Sr e g r e s s i o no ft h esum over each sub-period of excess returns (Z − b0) on factor sensitivities b plus a constant, producing
estimates of F∗
k (cumulative over each 3-month sub-period). Standard errors are calculated as described in section 3. Observed
fundamental is the sum of observed monthly changes in log exchange rates and log interest rates over the three months for
each sub-period. Pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis cover 9/98-11/98, 12/98-2/99, 3/99-5/99, respectively. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗refer to
signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel B: Eﬀective - Observed Fundamentals (δ)







This table presents the diﬀerence between the eﬀective fundamental (summed
over the three month sub-period) reported in panel A and the observed fun-
damental (also reported in panel A). Standard errors are not reported as they
are the same as those reported in panel A. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗refer to signiﬁcance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
36TABLE XI
Results for Sweden 1992
Panel A: Eﬀective Fundamentals (F
∗)
Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis
Eﬀective Observed Eﬀective Observed Eﬀective Observed
Fundamental Fundamental Fundamental Fundamental Fundamental Fundamental
∆e (be) -0.034 0.004 0.049 -0.048 -0.034 -0.132
( 0.034) ( 0.034) ( 0.033)
∆r (br) 0.015 0.488 -0.019
∗ -0.485 0.001 -0.013
( 0.010) ( 0.010) ( 0.010)
Constant -0.255
∗∗∗ 0.032 0.015
( 0.030) ( 0.030) ( 0.030)
Firms 114 114 114
R
2 0.04 0.07 0.01
G L Sr e g r e s s i o no ft h esum over each sub-period of excess returns (Z − b0) on factor sensitivities b plus a constant, producing
estimates of F∗
k (cumulative over each 2-month sub-period). Standard errors are calculated as described in section 3. Observed
fundamental is the sum of observed monthly changes in log exchange rates and log interest rates over the three months for
each sub-period. Pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis cover 8/92-9/92, 10/92-11/92, 12/92-1/93, respectively. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗refer to
signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel B: Eﬀective - Observed Fundamentals (δ)







This table presents the diﬀerence between the eﬀective fundamental (summed
over the two month sub-period) reported in panel A and the observed funda-
mental (also reported in panel A). Standard errors are not reported as they
are the same as those reported in panel A. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗refer to signiﬁcance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
37Appendix Table I
Effective Fundamentals (F∗):
A l t e r n a t i v eF i r s tS t a g eS a m p l e
Country Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis
Mexico ∆e (be) -0.016 -0.238
∗∗∗ -0.072
( 0.047) ( 0.055) ( 0.048)
∆r (br) 0.052 0.313
∗∗∗ 0.041
( 0.068) ( 0.079) ( 0.069)
Korea ∆e (be) -0.008 -0.073
∗∗∗ -0.059
∗∗∗
( 0.018) ( 0.018) ( 0.019)
∆r (br) -0.022 -0.013
∗∗ -0.030
∗∗∗
( 0.006) ( 0.006) ( 0.006)
Thailand ∆e (be) -0.083
∗ 0.006 -0.101
∗∗
( 0.042) ( 0.040) ( 0.045)
∆r (br)- 0 . 0 5 9
∗∗∗ -0.021 -0.094
∗∗∗
( 0.017) ( 0.016) ( 0.018)




( 0.016) ( 0.016) ( 0.018)
∆r (br) -0.008 -0.003 -0.014
∗∗∗
( 0.005) ( 0.005) ( 0.005)




( 0.023) ( 0.022) ( 0.023)
∆r (br) -0.005 -0.000 0.004
( 0.004) ( 0.004) ( 0.004)
Indonesia ∆e (be) -0.029 -0.456
∗∗∗ -0.775
∗∗∗
( 0.082) ( 0.086) ( 0.094)
∆r (br) -0.000 0.016 0.060
( 0.043) ( 0.045) ( 0.049)
Brazil ∆e (be) -0.130
∗∗ -0.116
∗∗ -0.025
( 0.057) ( 0.054) ( 0.052)




( 0.018) ( 0.018) ( 0.017)
This table recomputes eﬀective fundamentals for each country using an alternative ﬁrst stage
sample. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁrst stage sensitivities (betas) were estimated using a sample restricted
to the ﬁrst twenty four months after the crisis window (or less, if data did not span entire period).
The estimation used for Panel A of Tables IV—X was then performed on these alternative betas.
The columns “pre-crisis”,“crisis”, and “post-crisis” have the same meaning as the column headings




Country Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis
Mexico ∆e (be) -0.005 -0.238
∗∗∗ -0.014
( 0.037) ( 0.043) ( 0.038)
∆r (br) 0.025 0.245
∗∗∗ 0.055
( 0.048) ( 0.055) ( 0.048)
Korea ∆e (be) -0.012 -0.065
∗∗∗ -0.075
∗∗∗
( 0.020) ( 0.020) ( 0.020)
∆r (br) 0.003 -0.013 0.009
( 0.015) ( 0.015) ( 0.015)
Thailand ∆e (be)- 0 . 1 2 1
∗∗∗ -0.057 -0.223
∗∗∗
( 0.041) ( 0.041) ( 0.042)
∆r (br) 0.014 -0.062
∗ -0.076
∗∗
( 0.035) ( 0.035) ( 0.036)




( 0.019) ( 0.019) ( 0.020)
∆r (br) -0.001 0.008 -0.004
( 0.006) ( 0.006) ( 0.006)
Philippines ∆e (be) -0.026 -0.061
∗∗ -0.133
∗∗∗
( 0.028) ( 0.028) ( 0.030)
∆r (br) -0.010 0.006 0.001
( 0.013) ( 0.013) ( 0.014)
Indonesia ∆e (be) 0.085 -0.451
∗∗∗ -0.648
∗∗∗
( 0.078) ( 0.080) ( 0.082)
∆r (br) 0.010 0.007 0.024
( 0.044) ( 0.045) ( 0.046)









( 0.063) ( 0.100) ( 0.093)
This table models fundamentals as an AR(1) process. In particular, we estimate an AR(1) for each
fundamental and each country and use the residuals as innovations for the ﬁrst stage regressions.
With these new betas, we recompute the eﬀective fundamental during the crisis window. The
results reported above are comparable with those reported in Panel A of Tables IV—X. Standard
errors are in parantheses. It should be kept in mind that the observed fundamental implied by
the AR(1) (not reported) will not necessarily equal the observed fundamental from the random
walk model (reported in Tables IV—X). However, there are no major discrepancies between the
two alternative series.
39